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Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, have his-
tories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing
public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to
which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always
possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded
recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufﬁ-
cient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public
private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate con-
tinuation play.
KEYWORDS. Repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, co-
ordination, bounded recall.
JEL CLASSIFICATION. C72, C73, D82.
1. INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal incentives often allow players to achieve payoffs that are inconsistent
with myopic incentives. For repeated games with public histories, the construction of
sequentially rational equilibria with nontrivial intertemporal incentives is straightfor-
ward. Sincecontinuationplayinapublicstrategyproﬁleisafunctionofpublichistories
only, the requirement that continuation play induced by any public history constitute a
Nash equilibrium of the original game is both the natural notion of sequential rational-
ity and relatively easy to check (Abreu et al. 1990). These perfect public equilibria (or
PPE) use public histories to coordinate continuation play.
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Whilegameswithprivatemonitoring(whereactionsandsignalsareprivate)haveno
public histories to coordinate continuation play, some do have histories that are almost
public. We explore the extent to which perfect public equilibrium strategies continue to
be equilibria when histories are only almost public. We show that it is always possible to
coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is
a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufﬁcient to determine behav-
ior).1 But we also show a partial converse: in games with general almost-public private
monitoring,thisistheonlybehaviorthatcancoordinatecontinuationplayunderanap-
parently mild restriction on strategies. To make this precise, we must describe “general
but almost-public private monitoring” and characterize the restriction on strategies
When is a general private-monitoring technology close to some public monitoring
technology? To be close, there must be a signaling function for each player that assigns
to each private signal either some value of the public signal or a dummy signal (with
the interpretation that that private signal cannot be related to any public signal). Using
these signaling functions (one for each player), the private monitoring is close to the
public monitoring if the probability of private signals mapping to a given public signal,
under the private-monitoring technology, is close to the probability of that public signal
under the public monitoring (for any given action proﬁle). If there exist such signaling
functions satisfying this condition, we say there is almost-public monitoring. If every
private signal is mapped to a public signal, we say the almost-public-monitoring game
is strongly close to the public-monitoring game.
Using the signaling functions, any strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game
induces behavior in strongly-close-by almost-public-monitoring games. Given a se-
quence of private signals for a player, that player’s private state is determined by the
induced sequence of public signals that are the result of applying his signaling func-
tion. We show that every strict PPE with bounded recall induces equilibrium in every
strongly-close-by almost-public-monitoring game; and even if the private-monitoring
games are not strongly close to the public-monitoring game, there is still a natural sense
in which every strict PPE with bounded recall induces equilibrium behavior in every
close-by almost-public-monitoring game (Theorem 1). The idea is that with bounded
recall we can always restrict posterior beliefs to be sufﬁciently close to the public mon-
itoring by requiring the private-monitoring technology to be sufﬁciently close to the
public-monitoring technology. This result generalizes the main result in Mailath and
Morris (2002), where the private signal set was assumed to equal the public signal set.2
When a strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game does not have bounded re-
call, realizations of the signal in early periods can have long-run implications for be-
havior. We call proﬁles with this property separating. While the properties of bounded
1Thus when we refer to strategy proﬁles that coordinate continuation play in games with private moni-
toring, we mean strategy proﬁles where players’ choices are best responses if histories are sufﬁciently close
to being public.
2The extension is nontrivial because the richness of the private signals is important for the formation of
thatplayer’sbeliefsabouttheotherplayers’privatestates. Itturnsoutthattherequirementthattheprivate-
monitoring distribution be close to the public-monitoring distribution places essentially no restriction on
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recall and separation do not exhaust possible behavior, they do appear to cover most
behaviors of interest.3 When the space of private signals is sufﬁciently rich for some
player i in the values of posterior-odds ratios (this is what we mean by “general almost
public”), and the proﬁle is separating, it is possible to manipulate that player’s updating
over other players’ private states through an appropriate choice of private history. This
suggests that it should be possible to choose a private history with the property that
player i is in one private state and assigns arbitrarily high probability to all the other
players being in a different common private state.
A signiﬁcant difﬁculty needs to be addressed in order to make this argument: The
history needs to have the property that player i is very conﬁdent of the other players’
state transitions for any given initial state. This, of course, requires the monitoring to be
almost-public. At the same time, monitoring must be sufﬁciently imprecise that player
i, after an appropriate initial segment of the history, assigns positive probability to the
other players being in a common state different from i’s private state. This is the source
of the difﬁculty: Fix a period t. For any T-length history (T > t), there is an " (decreas-
ing in T) such that for private monitoring "-close to the public monitoring, player i is
sufﬁciently conﬁdent of the period T private states of players j 6=i as a function of their
period t private states (and the history). However, this " puts an upper bound on the
prior probability that player i can assign in period t to the players j 6=i being in a com-
monstatedifferentfromi’sprivatestate. SincethechoiceofT isdecreasinginthisprior
(i.e., larger T is required for smaller priors), there is a tension in the determination of T
and ".
We show, however, that this tension can be resolved for separating proﬁles imple-
mentable using a ﬁnite number of states. For such proﬁles the history can be chosen so
that not only do the relevant states cycle, but every other state transits under the cycle
to a cycling state. The cycle allows us to effectively choose the T above independently
of the prior, and gives us our main result (Theorem 3): Separating strict PPE proﬁles of
public-monitoring games implementable using a ﬁnite number of states do not induce
Nash equilibria in any strongly-close-by games with rich private monitoring.
Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the in-
troduction of even a minimal amount of private monitoring. Consequently, separating
behavior in private-monitoring games typically cannot coordinate continuation play
(Corollary 1). On the other hand, bounded recall proﬁles are robust to the introduction
of private monitoring. The extent to which bounded recall is a substantive restriction
on the set of payoffs is unknown.4 Our results do suggest, even for public-monitoring
games, that bounded recall proﬁles are particularly attractive (since they are robust to
the introduction of private monitoring). Moreover, other apparently simple strategy
proﬁles are problematic.
3We provide one example of a non-separating proﬁle without bounded recall in Section 4 (Example 3).
This proﬁle is not robust to the introduction of private monitoring. We do not know if there exist non-
separating proﬁles without bounded recall that are robust to private monitoring.
4Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) show that for some parameterizations of the repeated prisoners’
dilemma, the restriction to strongly symmetric bounded recall PPE results in a dramatic collapse of the
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Wehaveanalyzedtherobustnessofﬁxedstrategyproﬁlestoprivatemonitoring. Our
resultsdonotsayanythingaboutthesetofallequilibriumpayoffsinprivate-monitoring
games.5 While this classic question is important, we believe that there are at least three
reasons why it is nonetheless also interesting to focus on a ﬁxed strategy proﬁle. First,
researchers using repeated game theory to understand economic phenomena are inter-
ested in hypothesizing and testing particular strategy proﬁles.6 Second, understanding
propertiesofparticularstrategyproﬁlesmayturnouttobeanimportantstepincharac-
terizingthesetofallequilibriumpayoffs. Finally,oneofourﬁndingsisthatﬁnedetailsof
strategy proﬁles, such as history dependence, that are irrelevant for the classic recursive
characterization of the PPE payoff set are very important for the robustness question we
consider, and such ﬁne details might turn out to be signiﬁcant for other questions as
well.
Both our positive and negative results restrict attention to strict PPE, and the as-
sumption is important for both kinds of results. In such equilibria, players are not indif-
ferent between alternative actions and are thus coordinated in their continuation play.
Such strategy proﬁles capture basic intuitions about how cooperation can be sustained
in repeated games by the threat of coordinated deviation to punishment paths; they
form the basis of empirical applications of repeated game theory (see the references in
footnote 6); and we believe they are interesting objects of study. However, as noted in
footnote 5, the most permissive results in the private-monitoring literature have used
strategies with a signiﬁcant amount of randomization and indifference. The results in
this paper do not have anything to say about the robustness of such strategies.7
This paper introduces a useful representation of ﬁnite state strategies for private-
monitoring games. Each player has a ﬁnite set of private states, a transition function
mapping private signals and states into new states, and decision rules for the players,
specifying behavior in each state. The transition function and decision rules deﬁne a
Markov process on vectors of private states. This representation is sufﬁcient to describe
behavior under the given strategies, but is not sufﬁcient to verify that the strategies are
5Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chapter 12) introduces the main issues and concepts. See Kandori
(2002) for a brief survey of this literature, as well as the accompanying symposium issue of the Journal
of Economic Theory on “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.” For the repeated prisoners’ dilemma
with almost-perfect private monitoring, folk theorems have been proved using both equilibria with a co-
ordination interpretation (for example, Sekiguchi 1997 and Bhaskar and Obara 2002) and those that are
“belief-free” (for example, Piccione 2002, Ely and Välimäki 2002, and Matsushima 2004), where equilib-
rium strategies are constructed using randomization to ensure that players are indifferent between some
actions at all histories. While folk theorems cannot be proved using belief-free strategies for general payoff
matrices (Ely et al. 2005), variations on belief-free strategy proﬁles have been used to prove general folk
theorems (Hörner and Olszewski 2005).
6See, for example, Axelrod (1984), Ellison (1994), and Greif (2005).
7Bhaskar and van Damme (2002) and Ely (2002) show that trigger strategy proﬁles, which are strict PPE
of a repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect public public monitoring, can be approximated in nearby
gameswithprivatemonitoringwithastrategyproﬁlewithstrictmixing. Thispossibilitysuggeststhatallow-
ing non-strict equilibria may greatly assist in establishing robustness results. On the other hand, the equi-
libria with mixing require players to randomize differently at different payoff-equivalent histories, which
is arguably implausible. Bhaskar (1998) and Bhaskar and van Damme (2002) suggest that such strategies
often do not survive extensive form puriﬁcation perturbations.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 315
optimal. Itisalsonecessarytoknowhoweachplayer’sbeliefsovertheotherplayers’pri-
vatestatesevolve. Thisisattheheartofthequestionofwhetherhistoriescancoordinate
continuation play, since, given a strategy proﬁle, a player’s private state determines that
player’s continuation play. The crux of our analysis concerns how to track the evolution
of beliefs over other players’ private states during the course of play. In this paper, we
use this representation to analyze private-monitoring proﬁles constructed from a PPE.
However, the method is more general and we believe that it may be of more general use.
Examples can be found in Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Section 12.4 and Chapter 14),
where the method is used to analyze the mixed strategy employed in the classic analysis
of Sekiguchi (1997) and deﬁne belief-free equilibria.
Finally, we note that we have not allowed any communication beyond that con-
tainedintheequilibriumstrategies. Weviewourﬁndingsasunderliningtheimportance
of public communication in private-monitoring games as a mechanism to facilitate co-
ordination. For some recent work on communication in private-monitoring games, see
Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Fudenberg and Levine (2004), and
McLean et al. (2002).
2. GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
2.1 Private-monitoring games
The inﬁnitely-repeated game with private monitoring is the inﬁnite repetition of a stage
game in which at the end of each period, each player learns only the realized value of
a private signal. There are n players, with the ﬁnite stage-game action set for player
i ∈N ≡{1,...,n} denoted Ai. At the end of each period, each player i observes a private
signal, denoted ωi, drawn from a ﬁnite set Ωi. The signal vector ω ≡ (ω1,...,ωn) ∈ Ω ≡
Ω1 ×···×Ωn occurs with probability π(ω | a) when the action proﬁle a ∈ A ≡
Q
i Ai is
chosen. Player i does not receive any information other than ωi about the behavior of
the other players. All players use the same discount factor, δ.
Since ωi is the only signal a player observes about opponents’ play, we assume
(as usual) that player i’s payoff after the realization (ω,a) depends only on (ωi,ai).
We denote this payoff by u ∗
i (ωi,ai). Stage game payoffs are then given by ui(a) ≡ P
ωu ∗
i (ωi,ai)π(ω | a). It is convenient to index games by the monitoring technology
(Ω,π), ﬁxing the set of players and action sets.




is the set of private histories for player i.
2.2 Public-monitoring games
We turn now to the benchmark public-monitoring game for our games with private
monitoring. The ﬁnite action set for player i ∈ N is again Ai. The public signal is de-
noted y and is drawn from a ﬁnite set Y. The probability that the signal y occurs when
the action proﬁle a ∈ A ≡
Q
i Ai is chosen is denoted ρ(y | a). We refer to (Y,ρ) as316 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
the public-monitoring distribution. Player i’s payoff after the realization (y,a) is given
by e u ∗
i (y,ai). Stage game payoffs are then given by e ui(a) ≡
P
y e u ∗
i (y,ai)ρ(y | a). The
inﬁnitely repeated game with public monitoring is the inﬁnite repetition of this stage
game in which at the end of each period each player learns only the realized value of the
signal y. Players do not receive any other information about the behavior of the other
players. All players use the same discount factor, δ.
A strategy for player i is public if, in every period t, the action it prescribes depends
only on the public history ht ∈ Y t−1, and not on i’s private history. Henceforth, by the
term public proﬁle, we always mean a strategy proﬁle for the public-monitoring game
that is itself public. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a proﬁle of public strategies
that, after any public history ht, speciﬁes a Nash equilibrium for the repeated game.
Under imperfect full-support public monitoring, every public history arises with posi-
tive probability, and so every Nash equilibrium in public strategies is a PPE.
Any pure public strategy proﬁle can be described as an automaton as follows: There
is a set of states, W, an initial state, w 1 ∈ W, a transition function σ : W × Y → W,
and a collection of decision rules, di :W →Ai. In the ﬁrst period, each player i chooses
actiona1
i =di(w 1). Thevectorofactions,a1,thengeneratesasignaly 1 accordingtothe
distributionρ(·|a1). Inthesecondperiod,eachplayeri choosestheactiona2
i =di(w 2),
where w 2 = σ(w 1,y 1), and so on. Since we can take W to be the set of all histories of
the public signal, ∪t≥1Y t, W is at most countably inﬁnite. A public proﬁle is ﬁnite if W
is a ﬁnite set. Note that, given a pure strategy proﬁle (and the associated automaton),
continuation play after any history is determined by the public state reached by that
history.
Denote the vector of average discounted expected values of following the public
proﬁle (W,w,σ,d) (so that the initial state is w) by φ(w). Deﬁne a function g : A ×
W → W by g(a;w) ≡ (1 − δ)u(a) + δ
P
y φ(σ(w,y))ρ(y | a). We have (from Abreu
et al. 1990), that if the proﬁle is an equilibrium, then, for all w ∈ W, the action proﬁle
(d1(w),...,dn(w))≡d(w) is a pure strategy equilibrium of the static game with strategy
spaces Ai and payoffs gi(·;w) for each i and, moreover, φ(w)= g(d(w),w). Conversely,
if (W,w 1,σ,d) describes an equilibrium of the static game with payoffs g(·;w) for all
w ∈W, then the induced pure strategy proﬁle in the inﬁnitely repeated game with pub-
lic monitoring is an equilibrium.8 A PPE (W,w 1,σ,d) is strict if, for all w ∈W, d(w) is a
strict Nash equilibrium of the static game g(·;w).9
A maintained assumption throughout our analysis is that public monitoring has full
support.
ASSUMPTION 1. ρ(y |a)>0 for all y ∈Y and all a ∈A.
8We have introduced a distinction between W and the set of continuation payoffs for convenience. Any
pure strategy equilibrium payoff can be supported by an equilibrium where W ⊂RI and φ(w)=w (again,
see Abreu et al. 1990).
9Equivalently, a PPE is strict if each player strictly prefers his equilibrium strategy to every other public
strategy. For a large class of public-monitoring games, strictness is without loss of generality, in that a folk
theorem holds for strict PPE (Fudenberg et al. 1994, Theorem 6.4 and remark).Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 317
We extend the domain of σ from W × Y to W × ∪∞
t=1Y t by recursively deﬁning
σ(w 1,ht)=σ(σ(w 1,ht−1),y t) for all ht ∈Y t−1, where ht =(ht−1,y t).
DEFINITION 1. An automaton (W,w 1,σ,d) is minimal if for every state b w ∈ W there
exists a sequence of signals b h` such that b w = σ(w 1,b h`) and for every pair of states
w, b w ∈ W, there exists a sequence of signals hL such that for some i, di(σ(w,hL)) 6=
di(σ( b w,hL)).
The restriction to minimal automata is without loss of generality: every proﬁle has
a minimal representing automaton. Moreover, this automaton is essentially unique.10
Accordingly, we treat a public strategy proﬁle and its minimal representing automaton
interchangeably.
2.3 Almost-public monitoring
We now deﬁne what it means for a private-monitoring distribution to be close to a
public-monitoring distribution.
DEFINITION 2. The private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) is "-close under f to the
public-monitoring distribution (Y,ρ), where f =(f1,..., fn) is a vector of signaling func-
tions fi :Ωi →Y ∪{∅}, if
1. for each a ∈A and y ∈Y,





2. for all y ∈Y, ωi ∈ f −1
i (y), and all a ∈A, if π({ωi}|a)>0, then
π({ω−i : f j(ωj)=y for all j 6=i}|(a,ωi))≥1−".
The private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) is strongly "-close under f to the public-
monitoring distribution (Y,ρ) if it is "-close under f and, in addition, all the signaling
functions map into Y.
A private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) is (strongly) "-close to the public-monitor-
ing distribution (Y,ρ) if there exists a vector of signaling functions f such that (Ω,π) is
(strongly) "-close under f to (Y,ρ).
If the private monitoring is "-close under f , but not strongly "-close under f , then
some private signals are not associated with any public signal: there is a signal ωi sat-
isfying fi(ωi) = ∅. Such an “uninterpretable” signal may contain no information about
the signals observed by the other players.
10Suppose (W,w 1,σ,d) and (f W, e w 1, e σ, e d) are two minimal automata representing the same public strat-
egy proﬁle. Deﬁne a mapping ϕ : W → f W as follows: Set ϕ(w 1) = e w 1. For b w ∈ W \{w 1}, let b h` be a public
history reaching b w (i.e., b w = σ(w 1,b h`)), and set ϕ( b w) = e σ( e w 1,b h`). Since both automata are minimal and
represent the same proﬁle, ϕ does not depend on the choice of public history reaching b w. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that ϕ is one-to-one and onto. Moreover, e σ( e w,y)=ϕ(σ(ϕ−1( e w),y), and d(w)= e d(ϕ(w)).318 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
The condition of "-closeness in Deﬁnition 2 can be restated as follows. Recall from
Monderer and Samet (1989) that an event is p-evident if, whenever it is true, everyone
assigns probability at least p to it being true. The following lemma is a straightforward
application of the deﬁnitions, and so we omit the proof.
LEMMA 1. Suppose fi : Ωi → Y ∪{∅}, i = 1,...,n, is a collection of signaling functions.
The private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) is "-close under f to the public monitoring
distribution (Y,ρ) if and only if for each public signal y, the set of private signal proﬁles
{ω : fi(ωi) = y for all i} is (1 − ")-evident (conditional on any action proﬁle) and has
probability within " of the probability of y (conditional on that action proﬁle).
DEFINITION 3. A private-monitoring game (u ∗,(Ω,π)) is "-close (under f ) to the public-







for all i ∈N, ai ∈Ai, and ωi ∈ f −1
i (Y). We say also that such a private-monitoring game
has almost-public monitoring.
Note that because of our maintained assumption that public-monitoring games
have full support monitoring, a private-monitoring game that has almost-public moni-
toring relative to a ﬁxed ρ does not have “almost perfect” monitoring in the sense usu-
ally assumed in the literature.11
The ex ante stage payoffs of any almost-public-monitoring game are close to the ex
ante stage payoffs of the benchmark public-monitoring game (the proof is in the Ap-
pendix).

















Fix a public proﬁle (W,w 1,σ,d) of a full-support public-monitoring game (e u ∗,
(Y,ρ)), and, under f , a strongly "-close private-monitoring game (u ∗,(Ω,π)). The pub-
lic proﬁle induces a private proﬁle in the private-monitoring game in a natural way:
Player i’s strategy is described by the automaton (W,w 1,σi,di), where σi(w,ωi) =
σ(w, fi(ωi)) for all ωi ∈ Ωi and w ∈ W. The set of states, initial state, and decision
function are from the public proﬁle. The transition function σi is well-deﬁned, because




11The order of quantiﬁers is important: We can construct almost-perfect almost-public monitor-
ing distributions by considering full-support public-monitoring distributions arbitrarily close to perfect




FIGURE 1. The prisoners’ dilemma.
If player i believes that the other players are following a strategy induced by a public
proﬁle,asufﬁcientstatisticofht
i forthepurposesofevaluatingcontinuationstrategiesis




i ∈ ∆(W N−1). With a slight abuse of notation, we write βi(w−i | ht
i ) for the
probability that player i assigns to his opponents being in private states w−i at history
ht
i . We can recursively calculate the private states of player i as w 2
i = σ(w 1, fi(ω1
i )) =
σi(w 1,ω1
i ), w 3
i =σi(w 2
i ,ω2
i ), andsoon. Foranyprivatehistoryht
i , wewritew t
i =σi(ht
i )
for the private state of the player in period t.
REMARK 1. In private-monitoring games that are "-close, but not strongly so, a public
proﬁle induces only that part of the private proﬁle determined by histories of signals
ωi ∈ f −1
i (Y), with the remaining speciﬁcation of behavior not determined by the public
proﬁle. For an example, see part (ii) of Theorem 1; see also footnote 15.
2.4 Prisoners’ dilemma examples
We illustrate our deﬁnitions and results using the repeated prisoners’ dilemma under
various monitoring assumptions. The ex ante stage game is given by the normal form in
Figure 1.12
First, considertheleadingexamplefromMailathandMorris(2002, Section3.3). The
example illustrates that without bounded recall, beliefs may vary in extreme ways to
prevent a strict PPE from being an equilibrium in nearby private monitoring games.
EXAMPLE 1. In the benchmark public-monitoring game, the set of public signals is Y =
{
¯





p if a1a2 =e1e2
q if a1a2 =e1n2 or n1e2
r if a1a2 =n1n2.
The grim trigger strategy proﬁle for the public-monitoring game is described by the
automaton W = {w e,w n}, initial state w e, decision rules di(w a) = ai, and transition
12Here (and in other examples) we follow the literature in assuming the ex ante payoff matrix is inde-
pendent of the monitoring distribution. This simpliﬁes the discussion and is without loss of generality: Ex
ante payoffs are close when the monitoring distributions are close (Lemma 2) and all relevant incentive










FIGURE 2. The probability distribution of the private signals for Example 2. The distribution is
given as a function of the action proﬁle a1a2, where α = p if a1a2 = e1e2, q if a1a2 = e1n2 or
n1e2, and r if a1a2 = n1n2 (analogously, α0 is given by p0, q0, or r 0 as a function of a1a2). All




w e if y = ¯ y and w =w e
w n otherwise.
Grim trigger is a strict PPE if δ > (3p −2q)−1 > 0 (a condition we maintain throughout
this example). We consider the "-close private-monitoring technology where Ωi = Y
and the signaling functions are the identity functions. For " small, grim trigger induces
a Nash equilibrium in such games if q < r, but not if q > r. Consider ﬁrst the case
q >r and the private history (e1
¯
y1,n1 ¯ y1,n1 ¯ y1,...,n1 ¯ y1). We now argue that, after a sufﬁ-
ciently long such history, the grim trigger speciﬁcation of n1 is not optimal. Intuitively,
while player 1 has transited to the private state w n
1 , player 1 always puts strictly positive
(but perhaps small) probability on his opponent being in private state w e
2. Since q > r
(and " is small), the private signal ¯ y1 after playing n1 is an indication that player 2 has
playede2 (ratherthann2),andsoplayer1’sposteriorthatplayer2isstillinw e
2 increases.
Eventually, player 1 is sufﬁciently conﬁdent of player 2 still being in w e
2 that he ﬁnds n1
suboptimal. On the other hand, when q ≤ r, such a history is not problematic because
it reinforces 1’s belief that 2 is also in w n









y1) and (e1 ¯ y1,e1 ¯ y1,e1 ¯ y1,...,e1 ¯ y1). Under the ﬁrst history, while
the signal
¯




2 . Fortheﬁnalhistory, thesignal ¯ y1
continually reassures 1 that 2 is still playing e2, and so e1 remains optimal. (See Mailath
and Morris 2002, Section 3.3 for the calculations underlying this discussion.) ◊
We now consider a richer case where the private signal set is not equal to the public
signal set. The example illustrates that allowing richer signal sets may be important.
EXAMPLE 2. LetΩ1 ={
¯
y1, ¯ y 0
1, ¯ y 00
1 }andΩ2 ={
¯
y2, ¯ y2}. Theprobabilitydistributionofthesig-
nals is given in Figure 2. This private-monitoring distribution is
p
"-close to the public-





f2(¯ y2) = f1(¯ y 0
1) = f1(¯ y 00
1 ) = ¯ y, as long as " is sufﬁciently small, relative to min{α0,α−α0}.
In Example 1, we argued that if q < r, grim trigger induces Nash equilibrium behav-
ior in close-by private-monitoring games with Ωi = Y. We now argue that under the
richer private-monitoring distribution of this example, even if q < r, grim trigger doesTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 321
not induce Nash equilibrium behavior in some close-by games. In particular, suppose
0 < r0 < q0 < q < r. Under this parameter restriction, the signal ¯ y 00
1 after n1 is in-
deed a signal that player 2 has also played n2. However, the signal ¯ y 0
1 after n1 is a
signal that player 2 has played e2 and so a sufﬁciently long private history of the form
(e1
¯
y1,n1 ¯ y 0
1,n1 ¯ y 0
1,...,n1 ¯ y 0
1) leads to a posterior for player 1 at which n1 is not optimal. ◊
3. PPE WITH BOUNDED RECALL
As we saw in Examples 1 and 2, arbitrary public equilibria need not induce equilibria
of almost-public-monitoring games, because the public state in period t is determined,
in principle, by the entire history ht. For proﬁles that have bounded recall, the entire
history is not needed, and equilibria in bounded recall strategies induce equilibria in
almost-public-monitoring games.13
DEFINITION 4. A public proﬁle s has L-bounded recall if for all ht = (y 1,...,y t−1) and
b ht =(b y 1,...,b y t−1), if t > L and y τ = b y τ for τ=t −L,...,t −1, then
s(ht)=s(b ht).
Let Wt be the set of states reachable in period t, Wt ≡ {w ∈ W : w = σ(w 1,ht) for
some ht, where w 1 is the initial state}. The following characterization of bounded recall
is useful.
LEMMA 3. The public proﬁle induced by the minimal automaton (W,w 1,σ,d) has L-
bounded recall if and only if for all t, all w, w 0 ∈Wt, and all h ∈Y ∞,
σ(w,hL)=σ(w 0,hL).
If a public proﬁle induced by a ﬁnite automaton (W,w 1,σ,d), where W has K ele-
ments, does not have K(K −1)-bounded recall, then it has unbounded recall.
PROOF. The ﬁrst claim is proved in the Appendix.
For the second claim, suppose that the proﬁle induced by the ﬁnite automaton
(W,w 1,σ,d), where W has K elements, does not have K(K −1)-bounded recall. From
the ﬁrst claim, for some t, there exist w, w 0 ∈Wt and history h ∈Y ∞ such that
σ(w,hτ)6=σ(w 0,hτ),
for τ = 1,...,K(K − 1). The sequence {(σ(w,hτ),σ(w 0,hτ))}
K(K−1)
τ=0 , where (σ(w,h0),
σ(w 0,h0))=(w,w 0), consistsof K(K −1)+1termsofpairsofstates. Sincepairsofidenti-
cal states cannot arise, some pair of nonidentical states must be repeated. That is, there
13Denote a dummy signal by ∗. Mailath and Morris (2002) use the term bounded memory for pub-
lic proﬁles with the property that there is an integer L such that a representing automaton is given by
W = (Y ∪ {∗})L, σ((y 2,...,y 2,y L),y) = (y 2,...,y L,y) for all y ∈ Y, and w 1 = (∗,...,∗). Our earlier notion
implicitly imposes a time homogeneity condition, since the caveat in Lemma 3 that the two states should
be reachable in the same period is missing. The strategy proﬁle in which play alternates between the same
two action proﬁles in odd and even periods has bounded recall, but not bounded memory.322 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
exist w 00 6=w 000 and periods 0≤τ1 <τ2 ≤ K(K −1) such that
(w 00,w 000)=(σ(w,hτ1),σ(w 0,hτ1))=(σ(w,hτ2),σ(w 0,hτ2)).
Nowwehavew 00,reachableinthesameperiodasw 000 inﬁnitelyoften,suchthatletting e h
be the inﬁnite repetition of the cycle of outcomes τ1hτ2, we have σ(w 00,e ht)6=σ(w 000,e ht)
for all t. 
Fix a strict public equilibrium with bounded recall, (W,w 1,σ,d). Fix a private-
monitoring technology (Ω,π) "-close under f to (Y,ρ). Following Monderer and Samet
(1989), we ﬁrst consider a constrained game where behavior after “uninterpretable sig-




i ∈ f −1
i (∅), some τ satisfying t −L ≤ τ ≤ t −1}. This is the set of private histories for
which in any of the last L periods, a private signal ωτ
i satisfying fi(ωτ
i ) = ∅ is observed.
We ﬁx arbitrarily player i’s action after any private history ht
i ∈Hu
i . For any private his-
tory that is not uninterpretable, each of the last L observations of the private signal can
be associated with a public signal by the function fi. Denote by wi(ht
i ) the private state






i / ∈ Hu
i . We are then left with a game in which in period t ≥ 2 player i chooses
an action only after a signal ωt−1
i yields a private history not in Hu
i . We claim that for
" sufﬁciently small, the proﬁle (b s1,...,b sN) is an equilibrium of this constrained game,






i ) if t =1
di(wi(ht
i )) if t >1 and ht
i / ∈Hu
i .
But this follows from arguments almost identical to that in the proofs of Mailath and
Morris (2002, Theorems 4.2 and 4.3): since a player’s behavior depends only on the last
L signals, for small ", after observing a history ht
i / ∈Hu
i , player i assigns a high probabil-
ity to player j observing a signal that leads to the same private state (recall Lemma 1).
The crucial point is that for " small, the speciﬁcation of behavior after signals ωi satisfy-
ing fi(ωi) = ∅ is irrelevant for behavior at signals ωi satisfying fi(ωi) ∈ Y. It remains to
specify optimal behavior after signals ωi satisfying fi(ωi) = ∅. So, consider a new con-
strained game where player i is required to follow b si where possible. This constrained
game has an equilibrium, and so by construction, we thus have an equilibrium of the
unconstrained game. We have thus proved:
THEOREM 1. Fix a full-support public-monitoring game (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) and a strict perfect
public equilibrium, e s, with bounded recall L. There exists " > 0 such that for all private-
monitoring games (u ∗,(Ω,π)) "-close under f to (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)),
(i) if fi(Ωi)=Y for all i, the induced private proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium; andTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 323
(ii) if fi(Ωi)6=Y forsomei,thereisaNashequilibriumoftheprivate-monitoringgame,
s, such that, for all ht = (y 1,...,y t−1) and ht
j = (ω1
j,...,ωt−1
j ), if t > L and y τ =
f j(ωτ
j ) for τ=t −L,...,t −1, then
sj(ht
j)= e sj(ht)
for all j. Moreover, for all κ>0, " can be chosen sufﬁciently small that the expected
payoff to each player under s is within κ of their public equilibrium payoff.
We could similarly extend our results on patiently-strict, connected, ﬁnite pub-
lic proﬁles (Mailath and Morris 2002, Theorem 5.1) and on the almost-public almost-
perfect mutual minmax folk theorem to this more general notion of nearby private-
monitoring distributions.14
4. FAILURE OF COORDINATION
Examples 1 and 2 illustrate that updating in almost-public-monitoring games can be
very different than would be expected from the underlying public-monitoring game.
In this section, we build on that example to show that when the set of signals is sufﬁ-
ciently rich (in a sense to be deﬁned), many proﬁles fail to induce equilibrium behavior
in almost-public-monitoring games.
Our negative results are based on the following converse to Theorem 1 (the proof is
in the Appendix). Since the theorem is negative, the assumption of strong "-closeness
(rather than "-closeness) does not limit its usefulness. The assumption clariﬁes the
source of the failure of the induced proﬁle to be a Nash equilibrium, which is not due
to a difﬁculty with interpreting “uninterpretable” signals. Moreover, this failure arises in
any strongly"-closegameinwhichthebeliefhypothesisholds. Recallalsothatthepub-
lic proﬁle completely determines a strategy proﬁle in a private-monitoring game only
when the private-monitoring game is strongly "-close (Section 2.3).15
THEOREM 2. Suppose the public proﬁle (W,w 1,σ,d) is a strict equilibrium of the full-
support public-monitoring game (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) for some δ and |W| < ∞. There exists η > 0
and " > 0 such that for any game with private monitoring (u ∗,(Ω,π)) strongly "-close to
(e u ∗,(Y,ρ)),ifthereexistsaplayer i,aprivatehistoryforthatplayer ht
i ,andastate w such
that di(w) 6= di(σi(ht
i )) and βi(w1 | ht
i ) > 1−η, then the induced private proﬁle is not a
Nash equilibrium of the game with private monitoring for the same δ.
14Weincorrectlyclaimedthattheproﬁledescribedinthe“proof”ofthealmost-publicalmost-perfectfolk
theorem (Mailath and Morris 2002, Theorem 6.1) has bounded recall. See Mailath and Samuelson (2006,
Proposition 13.6.1) for a proof of the weaker result reported in the text.
15The result does extend to private-monitoring games that are "-close, but not strongly so. Any pure
private strategy for i can be represented as an automaton (f Wi, e w 1, e σi, e di), where e σi : f Wi ×Ai ×Ωi → f Wi and
(as usual) e di : f Wi → Ai. Say a private proﬁle (f Wi, e w 1, e σi, e di)i reﬂects the public proﬁle (W,w 1,σ,d) if for
all i (perhaps after relabeling states, see footnote 10) W ⊂ f Wi, e w 1 = w 1, e σi(w,ai,ωi) = σ(w, fi(ωi)) for all
(w,ai,ωi)∈W ×Ai × f
−1
i (Y), and ﬁnally, e di(w)=di(w) for all w ∈W.
Then, there exists η > 0 and " > 0 such that for any close-by private-monitoring game and any private
proﬁle reﬂecting the public proﬁle, if there is a player and a private history, and a state w ∈ W ⊂ f Wi with
the speciﬁed properties, then the private proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium.324 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
We implicitly used this result in our discussions of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
For example, in Example 1, we argued that there was a private history for player 1 that
leaves him in the private state w n
1 , but his posterior after that history assigns probability
close to 1 that player 2’s private state is w e
2.
Our approach is to ask when it is possible to so “manipulate” a player’s beliefs
through the selection of a private history that the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are sat-
isﬁed. In particular, we are interested in the weakest independent conditions on the
private-monitoring distributions and on the strategy proﬁles that would allow such
manipulation.
Fix a PPE of the public-monitoring game and a close-by almost-public-monitoring
game. The logic of Example 1 runs as follows: Consider a player i in a private state b w
who assigns strictly positive (albeit small) probability to all the other players being in
some other common private state ¯ w 6= b w. (Full-support private monitoring ensures
that such an occurrence arises with positive probability.) Let e a = (di( b w),d−i( ¯ w)) be
the action proﬁle that results when i is in state b w and all the other players are in state
¯ w. Suppose that if any other player is in a different private state w 6= ¯ w, then the re-
sulting action proﬁle differs from e a. Suppose, moreover, there is a signal y such that
b w = σ( b w,y) and ¯ w = σ( ¯ w,y), that is, any player in the state b w or ¯ w observing a pri-
vate signal consistent with y stays in that private state (and so the proﬁle cannot have
bounded recall, see Lemma 3). Suppose ﬁnally there is a private signal ωi for player i
consistent with y that is more likely to have come from e a than any other action proﬁle,
i.e., ωi ∈ f −1
i (y) and
πi(ωi | e a)>πi(ωi |(di( b w),a0
−i)) ∀a0
−i 6=d−i( ¯ w)
(where πi(ωi | a) is the probability that player i observes the signal ωi under a). Then,
after observing the private signal ωi, player i’s posterior probability that all the other
players are in ¯ w should increase (this is not immediate, however, since the monitoring
is private). Moreover, since players in b w and ¯ w do not change their private states, we
can eventually make player i’s posterior probability that all the other players are in ¯ w
as close to one as we like. If di( b w) 6= di( ¯ w), an application of Theorem 2 shows that the
induced private proﬁle is not an equilibrium.
The suppositions in the above logic can be weakened in two ways. First, it is not
necessary that the same private signal ωi be more likely to have come from e a than any
other action proﬁle. It should be enough if for each action proﬁle different from e a, there
is a private signal more likely to have come from e a than that proﬁle, as long as that
signal does not mess up the other inferences too badly. In that case, realizations of the
other signals could undo any damage done without negatively impacting on the overall
inferences. For example, suppose there are two players, with player 1 the player whose
beliefs we are “manipulating,” and in addition to state ¯ w, player 2 could be in state b w
or w †. Suppose also A2 = {e a2, b a2,a
†
2}. As before, suppose there is a signal y such that
b w =σ( b w,y), ¯ w =σ( ¯ w,y), and w † =σ(w †,y), that is, any player in the state b w, ¯ w, or w †
observing a private signal consistent with y stays in that private state. We would like the
odds ratio Pr(w2 6= ¯ w |ht
1)/Pr(w2 = ¯ w |ht
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privatehistories. Let e a1 =d1( b w), e a2 =d2( ¯ w), b a2 =d2( b w),anda
†
2 =d2(w †),andsuppose
there are two private signals, ω0
1 and ω00
1 consistent with y, satisfying
π1(ω0
1 | e a1,a
†
2)>π1(ω0
1 | e a)>π1(ω0
1 | e a1, b a2)
and
π1(ω00
1 | e a1, b a2)>π1(ω00
1 | e a)>π1(ω00
1 | e a1,a
†
2).
Then, after observing the private signal ω0
1, we have
Pr(w2 = b w |ht
1,ω0
1)





1 | e a1, b a2)
π1(ω0
1 | e a)
Pr(w2 = b w |ht
1)
Pr(w2 = ¯ w |ht
1)
<
Pr(w2 = b w |ht
1)
Pr(w2 = ¯ w |ht
1)
as desired, but Pr(w2 = w † | ht
1,ω0
1)/Pr(w2 = ¯ w | ht
1,ω0
1) increases. On the other hand,
after observing another private signal ω00
1, also consistent with y, while the odds ratio
Pr(w2 = w † | ht
1,ω00
1)/Pr(w2 = ¯ w | ht
1,ω00
1) falls, Pr(w2 = b w | ht
1,ω00
1)/Pr(w2 = ¯ w | ht
1,ω00
1)
increases. However, it may be that the increases can be offset by appropriate decreases,
so that, for example, ω0
1 followed by two realizations of ω00
1 results in a decrease in both
odds ratios. If so, a sufﬁciently high number of realizations of ω0
1ω00
1ω00
1 result in Pr(w2 6=
¯ w |ht
1)/Pr(w2 = ¯ w |ht
1) being close to zero.
In terms of the odds ratios, the sequence of signals ω0
1ω00
1ω00
1 lowers both odds ratios
if, and only if,
π1(ω0
1 | e a1, b a2)
π1(ω0
1 | e a)

π1(ω00
1 | e a1, b a2)
π1(ω00









1 | e a)

π1(ω00




1 | e a)
2
<1.
Our richness condition on private-monitoring distributions captures this idea. For




and let γa(ωi) = (γaa0
−i(ωi))a0
−i∈A−i,a0
−i6=a−i denote the vector in R|A−i|−1 of the log odds








DEFINITION 5. A private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) is rich for player i, given his sig-
naling function fi, if for all a ∈ A and all y ∈ Y, the convex hull of the set of vectors
{γa(ωi):ωi ∈ f −1
i (y) and πi(ωi |ai,a0
−i)>0 for all a0






the odds ratios from the displayed equations.326 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Note that we require only that private monitoring be rich for one player.
It is useful to quantify the extent to which the conditions of Deﬁnition 5 are sat-
isﬁed. Since the spaces of signals and actions are ﬁnite, the number of constraints in
Deﬁnition 5 is ﬁnite, and so for any rich private-monitoring distribution, the set of ζ
over which the supremum is taken in the next deﬁnition is non-empty.17
DEFINITION 6. Given f , the richness of a rich private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) for
i is the supremum of all ζ > 0 satisfying: for all a ∈ A and all y ∈ Y, the convex hull of
the set of vectors {γa(ωi) : ωi ∈ f −1
i (y) and πi(ωi | ai,a0
−i) ≥ ζ for all a0
−i ∈ A−i} has a




++ :xk ≥ζ for k =1,...,|A−i|−1}.
The second weakening of the logic of Example 1 described above concerns the na-
ture of the strategy proﬁle. The logic assumed that there is a signal y such that b w =
σ( b w,y) and ¯ w = σ( ¯ w,y). Thus along the history (y,y,...), if the player started out in
distinct states b w or ¯ w, he would remain in those distinct states and would continue to
play in distinct ways. But the logic continues to hold if there exists an arbitrary history
h such that some distinct initial states lead to distinct states forever and if, from such
distinct states, play is distinct along that particular history inﬁnitely often. This is the
idea behind the following deﬁnition of a separating strategy proﬁle.
Deﬁne R( e w) as the set of states that are repeatedly reachable in the same period
as e w (i.e., R( e w) = {w ∈ W : {w, e w} ⊂ Wt inﬁnitely often}). Given an outcome path
h ≡ (y 1,y 2,...) ∈ Y ∞, let τh ≡ (y τ,y τ+1,...) ∈ Y ∞ denote the outcome path from period
τ, so that h = (hτ,τh) and τhτ+t = (y τ,y τ+1,...,y τ+t−1). Consider a continuation path
( e w,h) consisting of an initial state e w followed by an outcome path h. The continuation
path ( e w,h) satisﬁes state-separation if there is another state w ∈R( e w) such that starting
in state w instead of e w would lead to distinct states into the inﬁnite future: formally,
there exists another state w ∈ R( e w) that satisﬁes σ(w,ht) 6= σ( e w,ht) for all t. In this
case, state w is separated from e w along history h. Recall from the proof of the second
claim in Lemma 3 that every unbounded recall proﬁle induced by a ﬁnite automaton
has a continuation path ( e w,h) satisfying state-separation.
The logic of our proof requires not only state-separation, but in addition distinct
behavior on the continuation path satisfying state-separation. The continuation path
( e w,h) satisﬁes behavior-separation if whenever state w ∈R(σ( e w,hτ)) is separated from
σ( e w,hτ), then all players choose different actions along the outcome path τh inﬁnitely
often. Formally, for all τ and w ∈ R(σ( e w,hτ)), if σ(w,τhτ+t) 6= σ( e w,hτ+t) for all t ≥ 0,
then
di(σ(w,τhτ+t))6=di(σ( e w,hτ+t)) inﬁnitely often, for all i.
Notice that every continuation path satisﬁes behavior-separation if, for each player, dis-
tinct states always lead to distinct actions. The need to behavior-separate the state
e w from every other state that can be reached inﬁnitely often is illustrated by our ear-
lier discussion: because private monitoring implies all such states are assigned positive
17The bound ζ appears twice in the deﬁnition. Its ﬁrst appearance ensures that for all ζ > 0, there is
a uniform upper bound on the number of private signals satisfying πi(ωi | ai,a0
−i) ≥ ζ in any private-
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A B C
A 3,3 0,0 0,0
B 0,0 3,3 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 2,2
FIGURE 3. The normal form for Example 3.
probabilitybyaplayer’sbeliefs, weneedtohavesignalsthatareinformativeaboutthese
states relative to e w. Now we have:
DEFINITION 7. The public strategy proﬁle is separating if there is a state e w and an out-
come path h ∈Y ∞ such that ( e w,h) satisﬁes state-separation and behavior-separation.
Clearly, a separating proﬁle cannot have bounded recall. The key question is how
much stronger is this property than having unbounded recall under the restriction to
ﬁnite state strategies. Since every ﬁnite unbounded recall proﬁle has a state-separating
path, the only way a ﬁnite state strategy proﬁle with unbounded recall can fail separa-
tion is if every continuation path satisfying state-separation fails behavior-separation.
The following example illustrates this possibility.
EXAMPLE 3. The stage game is given in Figure 3. In the public-monitoring game, there
are two public signals, y 0 and y 00, with distribution (0<q <p <1)
ρ(y 00 |a1a2)=
(
p if a1 =a2
q otherwise.
Finally, thepublicproﬁleisillustratedinFigure4. Underanyoutcomepathinwhichthe
sequence y 0y 0 or y 0y 00 occurs, all states transit to the same state. Under any outcome
path in which only y 00 appears, the state eventually cycles between w A and b w A. Thus
continuationpath(w,h)isstate-separatingonlyifh =(y 00,y 00,...). Butthiscontinuation
path is not behavior separating, since action A is then played forever. ◊
We think of this failure as pathological. In this example, it is easy to see that the pro-
ﬁleisnotrobust. Afterenoughrealizationsofprivatesignalscorrespondingtoy 00,beliefs
must assign roughly equal probability to w A and b w A,18 and so after the ﬁrst realization
of a private signal corresponding to y 0, B is the only best reply (even if the current state
is wC).
We do not have an example of a ﬁnite state strategy proﬁle with unbounded recall
that fails separation but is robust. Example 3 suggests an intuition why such an exam-
ple might be hard to ﬁnd: a strategy proﬁle with unbounded recall can fail separation
onlyifallstate-separatedstatesgiverisetoidenticalbehaviormostofthetime. Withthe













FIGURE 4. The strategy proﬁle for Example 3. In states w A and b w A the action A is played, while
in w B the action B and in wC, the action C is played.
possibility of belief drift, as in the example, it seems hard to make this consistent with
equilibrium. Moreover, this possibility of drift implies also that showing that these un-
bounded recall strategy proﬁles are not robust requires a quite different proof strategy
than that pursued in this paper.
It remains to ensure that, under private monitoring, players may transit to different
states. It sufﬁces to assume the following, weaker than full-support, condition:19
DEFINITION 8. A private-monitoring distribution (Ω,π) that is "-close to a public-moni-
toring distribution (Y,ρ) has essentially full support if for all (y1,...,yn)∈Y n,
π{(ω1,...,ωn)∈Ω: fi(ωi)=yi, i =1,...,n}>0.
THEOREM 3. Fix a separating strict ﬁnite PPE of a full-support public-monitoring game
(e u ∗,(Y,ρ)). For all ζ > 0, there exists "0 > 0 such that for all " < "0, if (u,(Ω,π)) is a
private-monitoring game strongly "-close under some signaling function f to (e u ∗,(Y,ρ))
with(Ω,π)havingrichness, given f ,forsomeplayer i ofatleast ζandessentiallyfullsup-
port, then the induced private proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring
game.
It is worth noting that the bound on " is a function only of the richness of the private
monitoring. It is independent of the probability that a disagreement in private states
arises. By considering ﬁnite state proﬁles that are separating, not only is the difﬁculty
identiﬁed in the Introduction dealt with (as we discuss at the end of the next section),
but we can accommodate arbitrarily small probabilities of disagreement.
19If an essentially-full-support private monitoring distribution does not have full support, Nash equi-
libria of the private-monitoring game may not have realization-equivalent sequentially-rational strategy
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Thus, separating strict PPE of public-monitoring games are not robust to the intro-
duction of private monitoring. It, of course, implies also that separating behavior in the
private-monitoring game typically cannot coordinate continuation play in the follow-
ing sense. Say a proﬁle is "-strict if all the incentive constraints are satisﬁed by at least ".
(The result follows immediately from upperhemicontinuity and Theorem 3.)
COROLLARY 1. Fix a vector of signaling functions f , fi : Ωi → Y. Suppose {(u k,(Ω,πk))}
is a sequence of private-monitoring games, with (u k,(Ω,πk)) strongly 1/k-close to some
public-monitoring game (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) and {(Ω,πk)} a rich (for some player i) sequence of
distributions. Fix a pure strategy proﬁle of the private-monitoring game in which each
player’s strategy respects his signaling function f j (i.e., σj(hj,a j,ωj) = σj(hj,a j, b ωj) if
f j(ωj) = f j( b ωj) 6= ∅). Suppose this proﬁle is separating (when interpreted as a public
proﬁle). For all " > 0, there exists k0 such that for k > k0, this proﬁle is not an "-strict
Nash equilibrium.
Since the equilibrium failure of separating proﬁles seems to arise after private histo-
riesthathavelowprobability,anattractiveconjectureisthatequilibriumcanberestored
by appropriately modifying the proﬁle at only the problematic histories. Unfortunately,
such a modiﬁcation appears to require additional modiﬁcations to the proﬁle, destroy-
ing the connection to the public-monitoring game.
5. THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Ourproofexploitsanalternativecharacterizationofseparationthatholdsforﬁnitestate
strategies, reported in the next lemma and corollary (proved in the Appendix).
LEMMA 4. A ﬁnite public strategy proﬁle of the public-monitoring game is separating if,
and only if, there is a ﬁnite sequence of signals hm, a collection of states Wc, and a state
¯ w ∈Wc such that
(i) σ(w,hm)=w for all w ∈Wc,
(ii) σ(w,hm)∈Wc for all w ∈R( ¯ w),




We emphasize that each state in the set of states Wc cycles under the given ﬁnite
sequence of signals and every state reachable (inﬁnitely often) in the same period as ¯ w
is taken into Wc by one round of the cycle.330 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
COROLLARY 2. Suppose (W,w 1,σ,d) is the minimal automaton of a separating ﬁnite
public strategy proﬁle. For any player i, the history hm, set of states Wc, and state ¯ w ∈Wc
can be chosen so that, in addition, di( b w)6=di( ¯ w) for some b w ∈Wc \{ ¯ w}.
The proof of Theorem 3 is by contradiction. Suppose there exists ζ>0 such that for
all k there exists a private-monitoring game (u,(Ωk,πk)) strongly 1/k-close under some
f to (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) with (Ωk,πk) having richness at least ζ, with the induced private proﬁle
a Nash equilibrium of the private-monitoring game.
The basic argument is most easily seen if the space of signals for each player is inde-
pendent of k, so that Ωk
i =Ωi. Then, we can assume πk converges to a limit distribution
π∞ on Ω (by choosing a subsequence if necessary). The behavior of the beliefs of player
i over the private states of the other players under the limit private monitoring distribu-
tion (Ω,π∞) is signiﬁcantly easier to describe. Since (Ω,πk) is strongly 1/k-close to (Y,ρ)
and πk → π∞, for each y ∈ Y the event {(ω1,...,ωn) : ωi ∈ f −1
i (y)} is common belief
under π∞. Moreover, if the other players start in the same state (such as ¯ w) then they
stay in the same state thereafter. We can thus initially focus on ﬁnding the appropriate
sequence of signals to manipulate i’s updating about the current private states of the
other players, without being concerned about the possibility that subsequent realiza-
tions derail the process (we deal with that issue subsequently). The difﬁculty, of course,
is that Ωk
i depends on k, and moreover, that in principle as k gets large, so may Ωk
i .










signal, and so we can partition Ω
k,ai
i into subsets of private signals associated with the
same public signal, Ω
k,ai
i (y). Order arbitrarily the signals in ∪aiΩ
k,ai
i (y), and give the






; note that λi,y is (crudely)
bounded above by λ∗ ≡ |Ai|/ζ for all k (recall footnote 17). With this relabeling, and















Without loss of generality, we can assume (1) holds with equality (simply include any
signal ωi ∈Ωi \Ωk
i in Ωk
i , so that πk
i (ωi |a)=0).
We augment Ωi, for each y ∈ Y, by a new signal denoted ω
y
i , and deﬁne Ω∞
i ≡ Ωi ∪
(∪y{ω
y
i }). We interpret ω
y
i as the set of i’s private signals associated with y that are not
in Ωi. For each k, we can interpret Ω∞
i as a partition of Ωk
i (each ωi ∈ Ωi appears as a
singleton, while ω
y
i ≡ {ωi ∈ Ωk
i \ (∪ai∈AiΩ
k,ai
i ) : fi(ωi) = y} may be empty). For each
a ∈ A, denote by b πk(· | a) the probability distribution on
Q
i Ω∞
i induced by πk(· | a).
Note that we now have a sequence of probability distributions {b πk(·|a)}k for each a ∈A
on a common ﬁnite signal space
Q
i Ω∞
i .Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 331
Bypassingtoasubsequenceifnecessary,wecanassume{b πk(ω|a)}k isaconvergent
sequence with limit π∞(ω | a) for all a ∈ A, ω ∈
Q
i Ω∞
i . Note that (Ω∞,π∞) is 0-close to
(Y,ρ).
Because there are only a ﬁnite number of players, by passing to a further subse-
quence if necessary, we can assume that the private-monitoring distribution is rich for
the same player i; we call this player the rich player. Moreover, by passing to yet a fur-
ther subsequence if necessary, we can assume also that, for the rich player i, ai ∈ Ai,
and y ∈Y, the convex hull of the set of vectors {γ∞






















In the following lemma, a private signal ωj for player j is consistent with the private
signal ωi for player i if f j(ωj)= fi(ωi), where fi and f j are the signaling functions from
Deﬁnition 2. It is an implication of this lemma that if player i assigns strictly positive
probability to all the other players being in the state ¯ w, then after sufﬁcient repetitions
of the cycle ~ ωL
i (deﬁned in Lemma 5), player i eventually assigns probability arbitrarily
close to 1 that at the end of a cycle, all the other players are in the state ¯ w.
LEMMA 5. Fixaﬁniteseparatingpublicproﬁleofthepublic-monitoringgame,andlet ¯ w,
b w, Wc, be the states and set of states identiﬁed in Corollary 2 for the rich player i. Then,






(i) σi( b w, ~ ωL
i )= b w,
(ii) for all sequences of private signals, ~ ωL
j , for any player j 6= i consistent with ~ ωL
i ,
σj(w, ~ ωL
j )=w for all w ∈Wc, and
(iii) for all w∈W n−1




i |w−i =w,wi = b w)
Pr∞(~ ωL
i |w−i = ¯ w1,wi = b w)
<1,
where Pr∞ denotes probabilities calculated under π∞ and the assumption that all
players follow the private proﬁle.
PROOF. The cycle ¯ y 1,..., ¯ y m from Lemma 4 induces a cycle in the states ¯ w = ¯ w 1, ...,
¯ w m+1 = ¯ w 1 and b w = b w 1, ..., b w m+1 = b w 1. We index the cycle by ` and write ¯ a` = d( ¯ w `)
and b a`
i =di( b w `). Let e a` ≡(b a`
i, ¯ a`
−i). Richness implies that for each `, there exists a vector
of nonnegative integers, (nωi)ωi∈f −1
i (y `), so that for all a0














i (ωi | e a`)/π∞
i (ωi | b a`
i,a0
−i),
we have, for all a0




i (¯ y `)

π∞
i (ωi | e a`)
π∞








i (y `)nωi for each `, denote by N0 the lowest common multiple
of {n1,...,nm}. Let ~ ωL
i denote the cycle of private signals for player i consistent with
cycling N times through the public signals ¯ y 1, ¯ y 2,..., ¯ y m and in which for each `, the
private signal ωi ∈ f −1
i (y `) appears (N0/n`)nωi times. This cycle is of length L ≡mN0.
Given a private state proﬁle w ∈ W n−1
c , let ˇ a`
−i denote the action proﬁle taken in





−i =w,wi = b w)
Pr∞(~ ωL
i |w t









i (¯ y `)

π∞











Forw6= ¯ w1,ineachperiodatleastoneplayerisinaprivatestatedifferentfrom ¯ w. From
Lemma 4.2, ˇ a`
−i 6= e a`
−i for at least one `, and so A(~ hL
i ;w) must be strictly less than 1. 
We are, of course, primarily concerned with private monitoring under the distribu-
tion (Ωk,πk). In this situation, one must deal with the possibility that player j’s private
signals may be inconsistent with player i’s observations. However, by choosing k suf-
ﬁciently large, one can ensure that this possibility does not arise with large probability
along thecycle ~ ωL
i . Thesubsequentlemmaimpliesthatthispossibilityneverariseswith
large probability.
LEMMA 6. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 5, and let ht
i be a private history for player
i satisfying b w = σi(ht
i ). For all η > 0, there exist ξ > 0 and k0 (independent of ht
i ) such
that, for all k >k0, if η<Prk(w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}|ht
i )<1 and Prk(w t














−i 6= ¯ w1|ht
i )
Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1|ht
i )
, (2)
where Prk denotes probabilities calculated under πk and the assumption that all players
follow the private proﬁle, and ~ ωL
i is the sequence identiﬁed in Lemma 5.
PROOF. For clarity, we suppress the conditioning on ht
i . Denote the event that play-
ers other than i observe some sequence of private signals consistent with the cycle
(¯ y 1,..., ¯ y m)N by ~ y−i, and the complementary event by ¬~ y−i. Then,
Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i )=Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)+Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ¬~ y−i)Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 333
and
Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)
≤Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)
=Prk(w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)+Prk(w t
−i / ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i),




c \{ ¯ w1}, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)
=Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1})Prk(w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1})
≤Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1})Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1),
and if Prk(w t
−i / ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1})<ξ (where ξ is to be determined),
Prk(w t
−i / ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)+Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ¬~ y−i)
<ξ+Prk(w t+L
−i 6= ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ¬~ y−i)
≤ξ+Prk(~ ωL
i , ¬~ y−i)





−i = ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i )≥Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1, ~ ωL
i , ~ y−i)
=Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)Prk(w t





−i 6= ¯ w1)





−i 6= ¯ w1| ~ ωL
i )
Prk(w t+L




i , ~ y−i |w t
−i ∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1})+xt(k)
Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)
×
Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1)
Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1)
≤
maxw∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i =w)+xt(k)
Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)
×
Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1)
Prk(w t













i , ~ y−i |w t
−i =w)
Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)
<1,








i , ~ y−i |w t
−i =w)+ξ0
Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)
<1−ξ0.334 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
The ﬁniteness of the state space and the number of players allows us to interchange the
max and lim operations. Consequently, there exists k00 such that for all k ≥k00,
maxw∈W n−1
c \{ ¯ w1}Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i =w)+ξ0
Prk(~ ωL
i , ~ y−i |w t
−i = ¯ w1)
<1−ξ0. (4)
Since (Ω,πk) is strongly 1/k-close to (Y,ρ), limk→∞Prk(¬~ y−i | ~ ωL
i ) = 0, and so there
exists k000 such that Prk(¬~ y−i | ~ ωL
i ) < ξ0η/2 for all k ≥ k000. Suppose ξ = ξ0η//2 and
k0 = max{k00,k000}. Since η < Prk(w t
−i ∈ W n−1
c \ { ¯ w1}) ≤ Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1), xt(k) ≤ ξ0.
Consequently (4), with (3), implies (2) (since ξ<ξ0). 
Lemma 4 guarantees that one round of the cycle of signals always takes a state not
in Wc into Wc, ensuring that the probability on states in W \Wc can be controlled.
LEMMA 7. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 5, and let ht
i be a private history for player i
satisfying b w =σi(ht
i ). Fix η>0 and let ξ and k0 be the constants identiﬁed in Lemma 6 .
There exists T such that if t ≥T, then for all k >k0,
Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c | ~ ωL
i ,ht
i )<ξ.
PROOF. Fix T large enough, so that if ¯ w ∈Wt (the set of states reachable in period t) for
t ≥T, then Wt ⊂R( ¯ w). Separation then implies Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c , ~ y−i)=0, and so
Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c | ~ ωL
i )
=Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c , ~ y−i | ~ ωL
i )+Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c , ¬~ y−i | ~ ωL
i )
=Prk(w t+L
−i / ∈W n−1
c , ¬~ y−i | ~ ωL
i )
≤Prk(¬~ y−i | ~ ωL
i ),
which is less than ξ for k ≥k0. 
We are now in a position to complete the proof. Suppose b ht
i is a private history
for player i that leads to the private state b w with t ≥ T, and let η be the constant re-
quired by Theorem 2. Since b w and ¯ w are both reachable in the same period, with pos-
itive probability player i observes a private history b ht
i that leads to the private state b w.
Moreover, at b ht
i his posterior belief that all the other players are in the private state ¯ w,
Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1|b ht
i ), is strictly positive for all k, though converging to 0 as k → ∞ (where
Prk denotes probabilities under πk). If Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1 | b ht
i ) ≤ η, then Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1 |
b ht
i )>1−η, and since di( b w)6=di( ¯ w), Theorem 2 yields the desired conclusion.
Suppose then that Prk(w t
−i 6= ¯ w1 | b ht
i ) > η and k > k0, where k0 is from Lemma 6.
Lemmas 6 and 7 immediately imply that, as long as Prk(w t+κL
−i 6= ¯ w1 | ht
i ,(~ ωL
i )κ) > η,
after the ﬁrst cycle, the odds ratio falls until eventually Prk(w t 0
−i 6= ¯ w1|ht 0
i )≤η, at which
point we are in the ﬁrst case (since b w cycles under ~ ωL
i , i’s private state continually re-
turns to b w).Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 335
REMARK 2. How is the difﬁculty identiﬁed in the Introduction dealt with? In the above
argument, the length of the cycle was determined by Lemma 5 from the limit distribu-
tion (Ω∞,π∞), independently of Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1 | b ht
i ). Separation is critical here, since it
allows us to focus on a cycle, rather than an entire outcome path. We then considered
private-monitoring games sufﬁciently far out in the sequence, such that along the cy-
cle, state transitions occur as expected with high probability (Lemmas 6 and 7). Since
we can use a cycle to manipulate beliefs, the magnitude of the prior is irrelevant; all we
need is that Prk(w t
−i = ¯ w1| b ht
i )>0.
REMARK 3. The difﬁculty with extending Theorem 3 to private-monitoring games that
are "-close, but not strongly so, to a public-monitoring game is that the public proﬁle
does not uniquely determine a private proﬁle (see Remark 1). Without further restric-
tions on the private proﬁle, it is difﬁcult to determine the evolution of beliefs. How-
ever, the proofof Theorem 3 (with essentially nochanges)shows the following (see foot-
note 15 for automaton representations of private strategies and the notion of reﬂects):
THEOREM 4. Fix (W,w 1,σ,d), a separating strict ﬁnite PPE of a full-support public-
monitoring game (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)). For all ζ > 0, there exists "0 > 0 such that for all " < "0,
if (u,(Ω,π)) is a private-monitoring game "-close under some signaling function f to
(e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) with (Ω,π) having richness, given f , for some player i of at least ζ and es-
sentially full support, and if the private proﬁle (f Wi, e w 1, e σi, e di)i reﬂects the public proﬁle
(W,w 1,σ,d) with f Wi = W for all i, then the private proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium of
the private-monitoring game.
The key observation is that under the assumption that the private proﬁle not intro-
duce any new states (i.e., f Wi =W), the continuation play even after uninterpretable sig-
nalsisstilldescribedbythepublicproﬁle(conditionalonthestate). Thelogicdescribed
in Remark 2 hence applies to this case as well.
The restriction that the private proﬁle not introduce any new states is substantive.
It is easy to construct counterexamples to Part (ii) of Theorem 1 under this additional
restriction.
APPENDIX: REMAINING PROOFS
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Suppose (u ∗,(Ω,π)) is "-close to (e u ∗,(Y,ρ)) with associated signal-










































































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from
P
y π({ω : fi(ωi) = y for each i} | a) > 1−"|Y|







 < " for all i ∈ N, ai ∈ Ai, and ωi ∈ f −1
i (y), and the third inequality follows










 + ". The last
term can clearly be made smaller than η by appropriate choice of ". 
PROOF OF THE FIRST CLAIM IN LEMMA 3. Supposethereexists L suchthatforallw,w 0 ∈
W reachable in the same period and for all h ∈Y ∞,
σ(w,hL)=σ(w 0,hL).
Then, for all w,w 0 ∈W reachable in the same period and for all h ∈Y ∞,
d(σ(w,ht))=d(σ(w 0,ht)) ∀t ≥ L +1.
If w = σ(w 1,y 1,...,y t−L−1) and w 0 = σ(w 1,b y 1,...,b y t−L−1), then for ht and b ht as speci-
ﬁed in Deﬁnition 4,
s(ht)=d(σ(w,y t−L,...,y t−1))
=d(σ(w 0,y t−L,...,y t−1))
=d(σ(w 0,b y t−L,...,b y t−1))=s(b ht).
Suppose now the proﬁle s has L-bounded recall. Let (W,w 1,σ,d) be a representa-
tion of s. Suppose w and w 0 are two states reachable in the same period. Then there
exist hτ and b hτ such that w = σ(w 1,hτ) and w 0 = σ(w 1,b hτ). Then, for all h ∈ Y ∞,
(hτ,ht) and (b hτ,ht) agree for the last t −1 periods, and so if t ≥ L +1, they agree for at
least the last L periods, and so
d(σ(w,ht))=s(hτ,ht)
=s(b hτ,ht)=d(σ(w 0,ht)).
Minimality of the representing automaton then implies that for all h ∈ Y ∞ and w,w 0 ∈
W reachable in the same period, σ(w,hL)=σ(w 0,hL). 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. Let φi(w) be player i’s continuation value from the strategy
proﬁle (W,w,σ,d) in the game with public monitoring (i.e., φi(w) is the continuation
value of state w under the proﬁle (W,w 1,σ,d)), and let φi(si | w) be the continuation
valuetoplayeri fromfollowingthestrategysi whenalltheotherplayersfollowthestrat-
egyproﬁle(W,w,σ,d). Sincethepublicproﬁleisastrictequilibriumand|W|<∞,thereTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 337
exists θ >0 such that for all i, w ∈W and e si, for any deviation continuation strategy for
player i with e s1
i 6=di(w),
φi(e si |w)<φi(w)−θ.
Every strategy e si in the game with public monitoring induces a strategy si in the














Denote by V π
i (w) the expected value to player i in the game with private monitoring
(u ∗,(Ω,π)) from the private proﬁle induced by (W,w,σ,d). Let V π
i (si |ht
i ) denote player
i’s continuation value of a strategy si in the game with private monitoring, conditional
on the private history ht
i .
There exist " and η > 0 such that for all strategies e si for player i in the game with
public monitoring, and all histories ht
i for i in the game with private monitoring, if the
game with private monitoring is strongly "-close to the game with public monitoring
and βi(w1 | ht
i ) > 1−η, then

V π
i (si | ht
i )−φi(e si | w)

 < θ/3, where si is the induced
strategy in the game with private monitoring. (The argument is essentially the same as
that of Mailath and Morris 2002, Lemma 3.)
Suppose there exists a player i, a private history ht
i , and a state w such that di(w)6=
di(σi(ht
i )) and βi(w1 | ht
i ) > 1 − η. Denote by s0
i the private strategy described by
(W,w,σi,di), e s0
i the publicstrategy describedby (W,w,σ,di), si the privatestrategy de-
scribed by (W,σi(ht
















i is a proﬁtable deviation. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. It is immediate that if the proﬁle satisﬁes the conditions in the
lemma, then it is separating. Suppose, then, that the proﬁle is separating. Given the
outcome path h ∈ Y ∞ and state e w from the deﬁnition of separation, σ(w,ht) denotes
the state reached after the ﬁrst t −1 signals in h from the state w.
The idea is to construct the set Wc by iteratively adding the states necessary to sat-
isfy parts (i) and (ii); parts (iii) and (iv) are then implications of separation. We start by
considering all states reached inﬁnitely often from states in R( e w) along h. While this
implies a cycle of those states, there is no guarantee that other states reachable in the
same period are mapped into the cycle. Accordingly, we include states that are reached
inﬁnitely often from states that are reachable under any history in the same period as
the states just identiﬁed, and so on. Proceeding in this way, we construct a set of states
and a ﬁnite sequence of signals with the properties that the states cycle under the se-
quence, and every state that could arise is mapped under the ﬁnite sequence of signals
to a cycling state.338 Mailath and Morris Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
We begin by denoting by w1(t) the vector of states (σ(w,ht))w∈R( e w) ∈ W R( e w). Since
W is ﬁnite, so is W R( e w), and there exists T 1
1 such that for all τ ≥ T 1
1 , w1(τ) appears in-
ﬁnitely often in the sequence {w1(t)}t. Let W 1 ≡ {σ(w,hT 1
1 ) : w ∈ R( e w)}, i.e., W 1 is the
collection of states that can be reached in period T 1
1 under h, starting from any state in




 ≥ 2. By the deﬁnition of T 1
1 , there exists an increasing
sequence {T k
1 }∞
k=2, with T k




and for all t ≥T 1




The ﬁrst displayed equation implies that for all w ∈ W 1, σ(w,T 1
1hT k
1 ) = w for all k. The
second implies that for any state w in R( e w) and any t ≥ T 1
1 , the state w 0 = σ(w,ht)
appearsatleastoncebetweeneachpairofdatesT k
1 andT k+1
1 , forallk. Fort ≥T 1
1 , w1(t)
has |W 1| distinct states, and so is equivalent to (σ(w,T 1
1ht))w∈W 1 ∈W W 1.
The recursion is as follows: For a set of states W κ and a period T 1
κ, let wκ(t) =
(σ(w,T 1
κht))w∈W κ for t ≥ T 1
κ. The recursive step begins with a set of states W κ and an
increasing sequence {T k
κ }∞
k=1, with T k




and for all t ≥T 1




Deﬁne R(W κ) ≡ ∪w∈W κR(w); note that W κ ⊂ R(W κ). Let wκ+1(t) denote the vector of
states (σ(w,T 1
κhT 1
κ +t))w∈R(W κ) ∈W R(W κ). There exists b t ≥1 such that for all τ≥ b t, wκ+1(τ)






κ+1)=w ∀w ∈W κ.
Now, deﬁne W κ+1 = {σ(w,T 1
κhT 1
κ+1) : w ∈ R(W κ)}. By the deﬁnition of T 1
κ+1, W κ ⊂ W κ+1.
Just as in the initial step, there is an increasing sequence {T k
κ+1}∞
k=2, with T k
κ+1 → ∞ as




and for all t ≥T 1




concluding the recursive step.
Since W is ﬁnite, this process must eventually reach a point where W κ+1 = W κ.
We have thus identiﬁed a set of states W κ and two dates T 1
κ and T 2
κ, such that letting
(¯ y 1,..., ¯ y m)≡T 1
κhT 2
κ and setting ¯ w =σ( e w,hT 1
κ) yields parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Coordination failure in repeated games 339
Separation implies that under h, for any state w ∈ R( e w)\{ e w} and for all players i,
there is some state reached inﬁnitely often from w under h at which i plays differently
from the state reached in that period from e w. The dates T 1
κ and T 2
κ have been chosen
so that any state reached inﬁnitely often under h from a state w ∈R( e w) appears at least
once between T 1
κ and T 2
κ on the path starting in period T 1
κ from the state σ(w,hT 1
κ).
Consequently, we have part (iii).
Finally, since |W 1|≥2, |Wc|≥2. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. If di( b w) 6= di( ¯ w) for some b w ∈ Wc \ { ¯ w} does not hold for
the current choice of cycle and states, by part (iii), it holds in some period of the cycle
hm = (¯ y 1,..., ¯ y m−1), say period `. Start the cycle in period `, (¯ y `,..., ¯ y m−1, ¯ y 1,..., ¯ y `−1),
and deﬁne the new ¯ w by σ( ¯ w, ¯ y1,..., ¯ y `−1). Finally, the set of cycling states is given by
{σ(w, ¯ y 1,..., ¯ y `−1):w ∈Wc}. 
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